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BOOK REVIEWS

HOW TO AVOID SUDDEN SHOCK
Schwartz, Peter. Inevitable Surprises: Thinking Ahead in a Time of Turbulence. New York: Gotham, 2003.
245pp. $27

The intelligence community is getting a
bad rap these days as it attempts to help
policy makers weather the myriad national security challenges in the Age of
Disruption. The controversy over weapons of mass destruction and protracted
post-conflict insurgency in Iraq are
only two incidents in a series of surprises. Whether it is the demise of the
Soviet Union, economic collapses in
Southeast Asia, the development of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan,
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, terrorist attacks on the United
States, or the subsequent anthrax attacks, being taken by surprise is becoming the norm.
Peter Schwartz, however, was not
knocked for a loop by many of these
events—in some cases he predicted
them. Schwartz is an expert at avoiding
surprises. Starting with his work with
Royal Shell in the 1970s, his efforts with
the Pentagon’s eighty-year-old futurist
and director of the Office of Net Assessment, Andrew Marshall, and the U.S.
National Security Commission in the
last decade, up to his present consulting
work with the Global Business Network,
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Schwartz has made a career out of helping clients avoid strategic surprises. He
does not necessarily make forecasts, but
he does predict that denial, defensiveness, and ignorance are the principal
preceptors for sudden shock.
Schwartz’s specialty is researching the
innumerable drivers and wild cards in
our environment from which he can
craft scenarios that will help strategic
planners and decision makers anticipate
crises well before they happen. He is no
stranger to naval readers, who will be
familiar with his The Art of the Long
View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World (Currency, 1991), once
required reading at the Naval War College. In Inevitable Surprises, Schwartz
points out that we will face numerous
sharp jolts or major discontinuities in
political, military, and economic areas.
“If anything,” he notes, “there will be
more, not fewer, surprises in the future,
and they will all be interconnected.”
These interconnected surprises, which
Schwartz calls discontinuities, will
bring about a different world, one in
which the rules of the game are fundamentally altered. The critical value of
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this work is the author’s belief that
many of these discontinuities have their
roots in ongoing trends and that we can
anticipate them. By realizing what today’s driving forces are, we can alter
our perception about today’s emerging
realities, anticipate the consequences,
and avoid surprise.
Schwartz offers a simple process for
thinking anew and avoiding major
shocks. The first step is to pay attention
and identify and monitor the driving
forces that influence tomorrow’s world,
get ahead of the so-called inevitable
surprises, and prepare for them. The
second step is to remove ourselves from
the rigid mental paradigms about what
is fixed and what can be changed in the
landscape. The final step is to envision
new strategies for dealing with new
circumstances.
Most of this book discusses macro-level
factors in terms of social, economic,
and technological change. Some of the
discontinuities Schwartz deals with in
chapter-length detail include: dramatic
extension in human longevity based on
improvements in medical science, with
substantial influences on retirement, social institutions, and the political power
of influential centenarians; a “great
flood” of immigration with resultant
social tensions in China, Europe, and
the United States; continued economic
growth in the developing world and a
return to what Schwartz called the
“long boom,” predicated upon the enhanced productivity of the Information
Age and the updated critical infrastructure that undergirds it; a series of interrelated breakthroughs in science and
technology, especially nanotechnology,
biomaterials, and regenerative medicine,
quantum computers, and fuel cells; and
a few environmental crises, including the

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol57/iss3/13

impact of global climate warming and
the coming of a great plague.
Military professionals and policy analysts will be particularly interested in
Schwartz’s range of geopolitical scenarios. In one scenario, the European
Union consolidates into an effective
bloc and begins to challenge what it
perceives as America the rogue superpower. China also grows in political
and military muscle, and it too seeks to
check the global dominance and influence of the United States. On the other
extreme, Schwartz paints a scenario of
American preeminence, including complete dominance of space with instant
global strike. In this scenario, because
the benefits of a benign superpower are
shared, a quiet and sustained Pax
Americana emerges.
Before anyone gets complacent about
American preeminence, read chapter 5,
in which the author details the dismal
prospects of the near future. His “catalog of disorder” includes an updated
version of the Four Horsemen of the
Apocalypse, beginning with terrorism,
religious wars—including evangelical
Christianity in Africa—criminal statehood in Mexico, ethnic conflict, and
HIV/AIDS. Schwartz’s grasp of the interrelated nature of many of these depressing transnational problems is
masterful. His grim projections of such
disorders are largely predetermined,
thus inevitable and therefore troubling.
These future flashpoints are all too
rarely identified as issues in the national
security community until U.S. military
forces are dispatched to provide some
form of stability.
Inevitable Surprises is well worth anyone’s time, as long as the reader understands that predicting is like planning—
it is not the prediction or the plan itself
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that is important but the diligent process of identifying drivers and developing scenarios that is invaluable. To
paraphrase Helmuth von Moltke, no
forecast survives contact with reality;
good forecasters, like good planners,
excel because they have gone through
the rigorous intellectual process of examining the mental geography of a
problem and anticipating the various
contours and conditions that could arise.
Read this book only if you would like to
avoid being surprised by tomorrow’s
predictable discontinuities.
FRANK HOFFMAN

Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities
Quantico, Virginia

Gray, Colin S. The Sheriff: America’s Defense of the
New World Order. Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 2004. 232pp. $29.95

What role should the United States play
in contemporary international politics?
This question, or rather debate, began
at the end of the Cold War and has
never really concluded. It is a unique
debate because while everyone disagrees
on the question, all agree on its substance—the United States is the preeminent power in the world. People refer
to the United States by various names:
the lone superpower, the unipolar moment, Pax Americana, and from some
of its erstwhile allies and former enemies, the unilateral hegemon or
hyperpower. All such names try to capture the signal fact that America carries
tremendous weight in world affairs,
though for obvious reasons everyone
interprets the implications differently.
In the United States, two different
groups dominate the contemporary
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study of strategy: defense analysts and
scholars of international security. In
both fields most writers seem content
to work on very specific problems. Defense analysts tend to emphasize what
many have called the Revolution in
Military Affairs or military transformation, while many in international security still contend for a theory-driven
approach to international conflict.
However, despite the fact that strategy
bridges politics and war, defense analysts narrowly focus on the details of
defense policies to the exclusion of the
larger political issues. On the other
hand, security theorists miss even the
most basic issues pursuing theoretical
elegance and, consequently, tend to
write only for one another. Colin Gray
avoids the pitfalls of each approach in
The Sheriff.
Colin Gray is professor of international
politics and strategic studies at the University of Reading, England, and senior
fellow of the National Institute for
Public Policy in Virginia. He has written extensively on strategy, geostrategy,
and defense policy, and has long been
connected to the defense establishments
of the United States and NATO. Many
of his former students are working in
both places and in the academy today.
Gray begins this work by trying to understand some of the major issues facing the United States in the post-post–
Cold War era and finishes by noting it
is the little things that imperiled everyone’s ability to see the larger picture. “I
found that so much about the U.S. role
in the world is coming into contention,
that were I to devote most of my pages
to military issues, as long intended, I
would be analyzing secondary issues
while leaving matters of first-order significance insufficiently addressed.” It is
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to the issues of first-order significance
that the book is addressed.
Given the fact of America’s preeminence in the world, what should it do?
Gray sees the United States performing
the role of “sheriff” of international
politics, where others suggest running
an empire. Gray explains that “sheriff is
of course a metaphor. By its use I mean
to argue that the United States will act
on behalf of others, as well as itself, undertaking some of the tough jobs of international security that no other agent
or agency is competent to perform.”
That is precisely what the United States
has been doing, albeit sporadically,
since the end of the Cold War. However, during the interregnum of the
Cold War and the attacks of 9/11, the
United States was strategically adrift,
particularly during the years of the
Clinton administration, which had no
real focus except in the hope of reviving
multilateral institutions.
Three things gave rise to a renewed
strategic focus for the United States.
The first was the election of the generally experienced, conservative leadership of the Bush team; the second was
the commitment to military transformation by Bush’s Pentagon team under
Donald Rumsfeld; and third, the catalyzing attacks of 9/11, which provided
focus for their efforts. Though the administration is focused on the war on
terror now, Gray believes that U.S.
strategy should also prepare for the
eventual return of state-centric conflict.
Gray is a classical realist. A classical realist differs from the neorealist of the
academy, who emphasizes theoretical
modeling from the realpolitik practiced
by cynical German politicians of the
Bismarck era. Classical realists take
their lead from the writings of
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Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and Clausewitz
and calculate strategy in terms of power
and geography, or geostrategy. Through
five chapters, Gray shows why he believes the proper role for the United
States is to sheriff the international
system—that is, to regulate the international political order. He believes history shows that world order is not
self-enforcing and unless the United
States commits to regulating it, it may
not be regulated at all; or, worse, U.S.
neglect may encourage others to try
their hand at regulating international
politics, to the detriment of the current
world order.
Gray makes a strong case for the U.S.
role in regulating international politics.
The role of sheriff will help provide the
conceptual focus for military planners
and advocates of transformation. He
also suggests ways the United States can
maintain its preponderance of power,
prudent ways to serve U.S. interests as
well as keep both domestic and international politics on its side, or at least not
overtly hostile. What he does not address, however, is why the United States
should act as sheriff. What is it about
America that makes it the best candidate for the job? It cannot be simply because it is the most powerful country in
the world.
Clausewitz famously links war—and
the instruments of war, the military—
to politics. The central question for
strategy, then, should be to what end
and for what purpose should strategy
be made? To answer that question, one
must first ask what are the conditions
of internal politics that lead the United
States to want, or need, to regulate international politics. What is it about the
United States that makes it the right
power to act as sheriff? Unfortunately,
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Clausewitz himself never addressed
politics much, and neither do his successors. However, if one assumes that
the United States is the right country
for sheriff, which Gray clearly does,
then it behooves us to pay attention to
what he says.
MARK T. CLARK

Director of the National Security Studies Program
California State University, San Bernardino

Korb, Lawrence J. A New National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons
of Mass Destruction: Three Options Presented as
Presidential Speeches. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003.

Since the end of the Cold War and the
subsequent demise of the Soviet Union,
the United States has been in search of
a new grand strategy. Over time, the
question “What should be the post–
Cold War U.S. grand strategy?” evolved
into “What should the United States do
with its preeminence?” The answers
provided by the various erstwhile successors to George Kennan, who gave us
the Cold War’s “containment,” have
ranged from neo-isolationism—dubbed
“strategic independence” by some of its
advocates—to primacy, the consolidation and indefinite preservation of U.S.
hegemony, of what had initially been
thought to be a “unipolar moment.”
Some, most notably neoconservatives,
have even made the case for a U.S. empire—primacy on steroids.
The declaration by the United States of
a global war on terror following the attacks of 9/11 has done little to bring
closure to the grand strategy debate. Indeed, the brutally manifest new threat
and the response to it, particularly as
formulated in the Bush administration’s
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September 2002 The National Security
Strategy of the United States of America,
and implemented in Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, served to further fuel the debate. For many, the boldness, even arrogance, exhibited in the administration’s
security strategy, especially the explicit
embrace of “preemption” and the aftermath of the Iraq campaign, have raised
more questions than have been
answered.
It is here that Korb, with this admirably
concise and sharply focused volume,
steps up to the plate. In the tradition of
such previous Council on Foreign Relations Policy Initiatives as Reshaping
America’s Military by Korb (2002) and
Future Visions for U.S. Defense Policy by
Hillen and Korb (2000), Korb here lays
out, in the form of presidential speeches,
three alternative national security
strategies.
As a senior fellow at the Center for
American Progress, former director of
the National Security Studies Program
at the Council of Foreign Relations, and
former assistant secretary of defense,
Korb possesses the intellect and experience this project requires.
The author takes as his point of departure
the concerns—in some corners, furor—
generated by the Bush administration’s
2002 security strategy. Controversies
surrounding four issues are highlighted:
the embrace of preemption (and apparent abandonment of containment and
deterrence); the willingness to sacrifice
the principles of political and economic
liberalism in the global war on terrorism by recruiting the likes of Pakistan’s
President Pervez Musharraf to the
cause, for example; the inclination to go
it alone; and the evident internal tensions and contradictions, particularly
the call for maintaining and enhancing
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U.S. primacy in the face of chronic economic challenges.
These issues are featured in assessments
of three alternative national security
strategies. The first alternative, “U.S.
Dominance and Preventive Action,” is
embraced by neoconservatives and
those within the administration and
elsewhere who have been referred to as
“assertive nationalists.” It begins with
the premise that “the most serious
threats to American security come from
the combination of terrorism, rogue
states, and weapons of mass destruction.” The capability and will to act preemptively and unilaterally are essential;
American military dominance must be
maintained; and U.S. security requires
widespread democracy and capitalism.
The second option, “A More Stable
World with U.S. Power for Deterrence
and Containment,” is said to be favored
by moderate Republicans and Democrats. They share the characterization of
the threat provided by advocates of option one, yet counsel against elevating
“preemption” to the status of a doctrine, emphasize the need for international support in the ongoing war on
terror, and warn against the strategic
overextension that may well result from
proactively spreading free-market
democracies.
The distinctly liberal third option, “A
Cooperative World Order,” is reminiscent of the Clinton administration’s national security strategy—“Engagement
and Enlargement,” in Anthony Lake’s
formulation. To the nexus of terrorists, rogue states, and weapons of mass
destruction, its proponents add the
longer-term threats posed by “global
poverty, growing lawlessness, and the
increasing isolation of the United
States from like-minded states.” This
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multitude of dangers requires
international diplomatic, economic,
and military cooperation; military responses are not to be given pride of
place. The United States must
strengthen, not tear asunder, international norms and institutions. Even the
world’s dominant military power cannot unilaterally ensure its security.
Korb masterfully translates the three alternatives into full-blown presidential
addresses to Congress and the nation.
He also systematically and evenhandedly assesses the strengths, weaknesses,
and political impact of each. Significantly, “liberal,” for Korb, is not a
four-letter word. Unlike many Republicans, he knows how to count. This volume should be required reading for
President George W. Bush, his advisers,
and the broader U.S. national security
community.
ANDREW L. ROSS

Naval War College

Scarborough, Rowan. Rumsfeld’s War. Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2004. 253pp. $27.95

Rumsfeld’s War is a close-up look at one
of the most influential figures in the
Bush administration, and a key leader
in the current war against militant
Islamism. The book examines Rumsfeld
the man, reviewing his long and varied
career at the top levels of government
and industry, and analyzes his role in
the two principal themes of his tenure,
transformation of the Cold War military and defeat of Middle Eastern
terrorism.
Rowan Scarborough is a well known
Washington Times reporter, specializing
in defense issues. While not a panegyric,
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his book provides a sympathetic look at
Rumsfeld. This is not surprising, in that
the Washington Times has been notably
supportive of the Bush administration.
As in his reporting, when writing his
book, Scarborough doubtless benefited
from close and frequent contact with
the senior people around the secretary
of defense.
One characteristic of Donald Rumsfeld
that leaps from the pages is his utter
self-assurance, bordering on arrogance,
which manifests itself as remarkable decisiveness and precision in thought and
speech. The book opens with Rumsfeld’s
conversation with President Bush soon
after American Airlines flight 77
crashed into the Pentagon. He is noted
as saying, “This is not a criminal action,
this is war.” His phrase crystalized a
radical shift in strategic thinking that
decisively took America from the listless strategic drift of the 1990s to one of
activism and intervention. As noted by
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Douglas Feith, “That was really a breakthrough strategically and intellectually.
Viewing the 9/11 attacks as a war that
required a war strategy was a very big
thought and a lot flowed from that.”
The twin themes of transformation and
fighting wars are inextricably intertwined. Serving as secretary of defense
for President Gerald Ford from 1975 to
1977, Rumsfeld returned to the White
House a second time with a specific
mandate from President Bush to
“transform” the military—bring strategy and military capabilities into better
balance with the post–Cold War
geopolitical context. The Bush administration came into office believing that
the Pentagon was too wedded to expensive, obsolescing systems from the Cold
War and to the accompanying policies,
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processes, and mind-set that demanded
more of the same. When Rumsfeld aggressively set out to overturn the tables
in the Pentagon, he was met with determined resistance, for both substantive
and stylistic reasons. By early September 2001, there were widespread rumors that Rumsfeld would be the first
cabinet secretary to resign, over his inability to foster change in the Pentagon.
Flight 77 changed all that. The United
States was no longer chasing criminals,
it was at war. The operations in Afghanistan were dominated by remarkable
synergies between special operations
forces and precision weapons, themes
that had long been pushed by “transformation” advocates. In both Afghanistan
and Iraq, Rumsfeld insisted on far
smaller numbers of ground combat
units than the military leadership was
comfortable with, arguing that the synergies possible in a heavily netted joint
battle space, coupled with precision
weapons and targeting, greatly increased the lethality and effectiveness of
U.S. forces. The combat results amply
repaid his confidence.
The lessons from the fighting merely redoubled Rumsfeld’s determination to
keep transforming the Department of
Defense. Battlefield results notwithstanding, change in the military bureaucratic processes remained difficult.
Rumsfeld noted that he “was struck by . . .
how resistant people are to looking at
strategy in a different way and pursuing
advantages, rather than focusing on reacting to threats.” On the other hand,
his often abrasive manner needlessly
antagonized people otherwise willing to
help bring about overdue change in the
Pentagon.
There is no doubt, however, that
Rumsfeld has made an enormous effort
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to overcome the stultifying stasis of the
huge Department of Defense bureaucracies—military and civilian—and the
mental inertia of fifty years of Cold War
thinking. As Scarborough notes,
“Rumsfeld’s task of reconfiguring the
military and fighting the war on terror
is so immense that it will take the light
of history to determine exactly what he
finally accomplished and at what he
failed.” If nothing else, Rumsfeld created, if not institutionalized, the state of
intellectual ferment that antecedes major change in any large organization.
Rumsfeld’s War is a quick, instructive
read from a pro-Rumsfeld perspective.
In that sense, it perhaps could be considered a counter to Bob Woodward’s
two recent “insider” books on the current war, for which Woodward received
very little support from Rumsfeld, and
in which Rumsfeld is not sympathetically depicted. On the downside, the
book stylistically feels somewhat as if
the author threw together some of his
day-to-day reporting text and called it a
book. Also, fully one-third of the book
consists of appendices, with copies of
various memos and papers, many classified “secret”; no military reader can
applaud the open use of such documents. However, the book is an interesting depiction of a remarkable man.
As Scarborough notes on the final
page, “It is hard to imagine any other
man to whom Bush could have turned
to fight this war with more tenacity,
panache, and, at the appropriate time,
good humor.”
JAN VAN TOL

Captain, U.S. Navy
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Machiavelli, Niccolò. The Art of War. Edited and
translated by Christopher Lynch. Chicago: Univ.
of Chicago Press, 2003. 262pp. $25

Machiavelli’s classic, if now rarely read,
The Art of War was probably the single
most popular military treatise in Europe prior to Jomini—Clausewitz was a
professed admirer.
At first sight, this book, with its apparent attempt to revive the infantrycentered military organization of the
imperial Roman legions, seems hopelessly irrelevant to present concerns.
Even within its historical setting (it was
originally published in 1521),
Machiavelli’s work is often dismissed
today for its alleged failure to appreciate the social and technological
trends—particularly the growing importance of gunpowder—underpinning
the “revolution in military affairs” of
the sixteenth century. Christopher
Lynch makes an excellent case that such
interpretations neglect the literary or
rhetorical dimension of The Art of War
and its relationship to Machiavelli’s
larger intellectual project. In an extensive introduction, as well as an interpretive essay, Lynch rebuts the criticisms of
contemporary scholars, defends
Machiavelli’s grasp of the military realities of his own day, and reinterprets the
intention of the work in relation to
Machiavelli’s more famous political treatises, The Prince and Discourses on Livy.
Lynch’s key point is that Machiavelli
was not simply the backward-looking
admirer of Rome he is often taken to be
but a revolutionary thinker who combined elements of past military and political systems in a novel synthesis. His
apparent reliance on Roman models is
to be understood fundamentally as a
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rhetorical device designed to appeal to
the prejudices of the humanist-oriented
Italian elite of his day. At the military
level, Lynch argues that Machiavelli’s
appreciation of the role of artillery and
cavalry has long been underestimated.
Machiavelli goes out of his way to call
attention to the limitations of the Roman way of warfare, which was evident
in their campaigns against the
Parthians, who relied exclusively on
light mobile cavalry armed with the
bow and guerilla-style raiding tactics.
Lynch suggests that what Machiavelli ultimately envisions is a synthesis of Rome
or “Europe” and “Asia,” a combination
of Clausewitzian commitment to the decisive battle and extensive employment
of maneuver, deception, and surprise in
a manner reminiscent of Sun Tzu.
Whatever view one takes of Lynch’s
bold and provocative reading of
Machiavelli’s text, his handling of the
translation is exemplary and unlikely to
be challenged in the foreseeable future.
He makes use of the definitive critical
edition of the Italian text published in
Rome in 2001, which removes many
errors present in older versions. The
translation itself is relatively literal, with
occasional awkwardness but much enhanced access to the terminology of
Machiavelli himself; there is also a very
extensive glossary of terms.
CARNES LORD

Naval War College

Singer, Peter W. Corporate Warriors. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell Univ. Press, 2003. 330pp. $35

Corporate Warriors is a must read for
military professionals and national security experts. It opens a dialogue to a
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valuable aspect of national security that
demands greater attention—the armed
forces’ use of contractors. The framework Singer develops is especially
worthwhile, and although many of his
suggestions are often provocative, in
some areas his analysis is flawed and the
implications are loose and unsupported. Overall, however, this work is a
superb effort to advance discussion on a
critical topic.
The Bush administration has made it
clear that even with the demands related to the global war on terror, it
would prefer not to dramatically increase the size of its forces. To make up
for the difference—particularly with respect to Afghanistan and Iraq—contractors have been hired to pick up the
slack. Hence, the current war is one
where corporate warriors of private
military firms have become part of the
environment.
Throughout the world other states and
international organizations have also
turned to private military firms for assistance. Singer argues persuasively that
there are policy and operational concerns about the use of these firms that
need to be examined more thoroughly.
The book is divided into three parts, of
which the first two are the most useful
and of durable value. “The Rise” contains an interesting thumbnail of mercenaries through the ages and sets the
context for understanding contemporary motivations for the use of private
military firms. “Organization and Operations” provides an exceptionally
useful framework for understanding the
roles of various private firms that perform duties often identified with the
military. Chapter 6, “The Private Military Industry Classified,” lays out the
taxonomy for firms involved in
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military-like activities and distinguishes
between providers, consultants, and
support firms. The next three chapters
are devoted to contemporary examples
for three types of firms: Executive Outcomes, the notorious but now officially
disbanded South African–based mercenary group, illustrates a military provider firm. MPRI, an American-based
firm founded, run, and largely staffed
by retired flag officers, illustrates a military consulting firm; and Brown and
Root, logistics providers, is a U.S.-based
Halliburton subsidiary and illustrates a
military support firm. In addition to
clarifying the types of firms, these chapters are engaging case studies of prominent and influential corporations.
The book contains some significant
flaws, but they generally stem from the
groundbreaking effort to comprehend
the significance of these firms. There
are also many loose assertions, insinuations, and innuendos that are unlikely to
withstand closer scrutiny, but for now,
as an opening argument, they should be
taken seriously.
The effort to differentiate the firms in
an analytical and useful fashion breaks
down in part 3, entitled “Implications.”
The words “possible,” “might,” and
“can” show up with inordinate frequency and are indicative of a looser,
more speculative analysis. Here, Singer
has a hard time maintaining the distinction between the firms he had carefully created earlier. The effect is often
to tar all provider firms that bear the
most resemblance to mercenaries or
traditional military combat organizations. Singer darkly intones about the
pitfalls and potential problems that can
arise from the use of private military
corporations. In this section, he tends
to lump together all flavors of private
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military corporations, suggesting guilt
by association with a small number of
admittedly distasteful companies. This
tendency to associate loosely all firms
with the sins of the most egregious ones
(almost always provider firms) seems
even less fair given the fact that elsewhere Singer notes that such firms
constitute a small fraction of the overall
private military firm population. Many
of his accusations do not apply well to
support firms. A more useful approach
would have been to assess the implications for each type of firm with respect
to contracting dilemmas, market dynamics, accountability, civil-military
relations, morality, and effectiveness.
Corporate Warriors is a valuable point
of departure for understanding private
military firms. It has cut a path through
the dense thicket of concerns about
their appropriate role but has by no
means cleared the way. The book opens
a debate that should engage military
professionals, civilian national security
leaders, and civil society. In the pursuit
of national objectives there are many
potentially useful instruments, and this
book is clearly one of them. Better understanding private military firms and
addressing their appropriate role are essential challenges.
RICHARD LACQUEMENT

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College

Schneider, Barry R., and Jerrold Post, eds. Know
Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary Leaders and
Their Strategic Cultures. Maxwell Air Force Base,
Ala.: U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center,
2002. 325pp.

The devastating attack of 9/11 starkly
revealed how the United States failed to
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understand its adversary and, by extension, itself. The difficult, age-old challenge for the United States to accurately
assess foreign leaders has not changed,
nor has its spotty track record of getting
it right.
It is a tough business getting at human
identity and predicting the behavior of
reclusive, complex characters to whom
we have no access and who possess
weapons of mass destruction. However,
with America’s extraordinary resources
one must ask why the United States has
not brought to bear its best know-how
to fill this serious vacuum of
understanding.
The U.S. Air Force’s Counterproliferation Center’s “America’s Adversary
Project” has tackled this problem and
produced Know Thy Enemy, which is a
fine collection of studies on the personalities and cultural context of such dangerous international rivals as Iran,
North Korea, Libya, Syria, and terrorist
groups like al-Qa‘ida.
Co-editors Jerrold Post, psychiatrist
and former CIA profiling guru, who
now heads the Political Psychology Program at George Washington University,
and Barry Schneider, director of the
Counterproliferation Center at Maxwell
Air Force Base, assembled a formidable
group of leadership assessors with regional knowledge and functional expertise ranging from history, international
relations and security, and war fighting
to Japanese art.
Schneider’s introduction, “Deterring
International Rivals from Escalation,”
critiques the inadequacies of classical
political science deterrence theory relative to twenty-first-century enemies
armed with lethal weapons. The United
States must know these enemies’ “hot
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buttons” and what contingencies could
affect their decision to use weapons of
mass destruction.
Both authors argue that although necessary, traditional profiling is not sufficient to understand the enemy. A
deeper appreciation of individual personalities and their strategic cultures is
necessary to supplement deterrence
theory’s shortcomings. What is now required in each case are specific U.S. deterrence policies tailored to each leader’s
unique profile, which directly informs
our policy and public diplomacy.
Three essays bookend seven leadership
profiles, offering a loose theoretical alternative and some recommendations.
The seven assessments are timely,
in-depth, and informative. “Kim
Chong-Il’s Erratic Decision Making and
North Korea’s Strategic Culture” by
Merrily Baird is well done, synthesizing
excellent research analysis into a working model for assessment.
Two other thought pieces are Alexander
George’s “The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral
Models of Adversaries” and the concluding chapter by Post and Schneider,
“Precise Assessments of Rivals: Vital
Asymmetric War Threat Environment.”
George argues that it is necessary when
dealing with irrational adversaries to
distinguish between abstract concepts
and real-time strategy. He states that
“actor specific” calls for a more differentiated behavioral model of adversaries,
but he qualifies the recommendations
in light of the high degree of uncertainty and context specificity within
strategic cultures. Post and Schneider
reiterate that to avert an adversary’s
use of weapons of mass destruction,
models of actor-specific psychology
and decision making are required.
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For those seeking more than a basic education, this work provides a serious
guide to today’s “hottest” adversaries
and their weapons of mass destruction.
Through well researched history, biography, and analysis of the cultural and
strategic setting, this book acquaints
readers with today’s enemies and invites
them to ponder critically the propensity
of these enemies to use their weapons.

image management can disguise. Direct
microanalysis at the level of structure of
a leader’s videotaped expression offers
insights into psychological states and
cognitive patterns, cues into how these
contextually unfold over time, and
topic-yielding insights into stress, credibility, level of certitude, and conflict
that can still remain undetected after
years of traditional analysis.

A curious omission of this research is
its lack of any systematic methodological discussion. The book’s primary assumption is that deterring adversaries
requires an understanding of their strategic culture. Yet nowhere do the editors formally define strategic culture
or its link to the adversary. The reader
comes to appreciate, however, that each
study uniquely attempts to make the
connection.

Challenging the way policy makers and
analysts think about this vacuum in
understanding weapons of mass destruction and foreign adversaries is the
problem that this book illuminates, and
it is perhaps ultimately its most significant contribution.

Between the lines, this study calls for a
new paradigm, yet the book itself
mostly relies on an outdated theoretical
approach that ultimately handicaps
what it set out to do—assess adversaries.
That kind of work requires a deeper analytic template for profile analysis than
presently conceived, one that cannot be
wedged into political science paradigms.
Ultimately, knowing the enemy requires a better appreciation of the advanced capabilities that studies of such
behavioral areas as emotion, cognition,
and performance can offer. Alongside
traditional political science and psychology, this brings a deeper understanding to the urgent and complex
problem of knowing our adversaries in
relation to deterrence, information
warfare, and psychological operations.
An adversary’s behavioral structure reflects his identity and a consistency of
pattern and style that no amount of
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BRENDA L. CONNORS

Naval War College

Keegan, John. Intelligence in War: Knowledge of
the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda. New York:
Knopf, 2003. 387pp. $30

Among many military historians, the
release of a book by John Keegan is
cause for celebration, and the sentiment
is not altogether out of place. Keegan’s
prolific output of insightful studies,
reaching back to his seminal Face of
Battle (1992), has won for himself devotees from both the academic and public
sectors. In his latest book, Intelligence in
War, Keegan returns to the distinctive
format he used in The Face of Battle,
dividing his study into several vignettes
from a broad range of military history—what he labels here as “a collection of case studies”—organized, in this
case, to highlight the effect that good
intelligence has on military operations,
and the general role intelligence plays
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in underpinning the effectiveness of
armed forces in the field.
Beginning with Admiral Horatio Nelson’s
chase of the French Mediterranean fleet
in 1798, Keegan goes on to discuss the
role of intelligence in Stonewall Jackson’s
Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1862,
the British navy’s search for Rear Admiral Maximilian von Spee and his ships
in World War I, and the battle of Midway, the German assault on Crete, and
the Battle of the Atlantic in World War
II. In each of these, we see how the
gathering and the use of intelligence—
two very different acts—affected the action. As usual, Keegan’s narrative skill
sets the stage succinctly for his discussion. We feel how heavily the unknown
weighs on the commanders, Nelson especially, and how at times they were
bogged down sorting through an overabundance of intelligence, especially
after the advent of wireless communication, to divine the plans of the enemy.
Commanders had to deal with many
possible answers to difficult questions,
usually with only one being the right
answer. Intelligence, we realize, works
to weed out possibilities and narrow
the options.
A book-length study of how crucial intelligence is will almost inevitably run
the risk of elevating this one element
above all other elements in a successful
military operation. “If only this commander had known about the enemy’s
troops,” we might find ourselves saying,
or, “If only his spies would have alerted
the admiral to his opponent’s plans the
outcome here would surely have been
different.” To his credit, however,
Keegan avoids this determinism that
would cause us to think that with good
intelligence, battlefield victories can be
made all but certain. On the contrary,
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he acknowledges that “however good
the intelligence available before an encounter may appear to be . . . the outcome will still be decided by the fight.”
Brutal fighting, we are reminded, along
with a good bit of luck, are the key determinants of battlefield success. What
Keegan instead shows is that good intelligence can reduce the scope of the unknown, and most importantly remove
guesswork from the equation as much
as possible. “Thought,” Keegan explains, “offers a means of reducing the
price” of the cold, bloody attrition that
lurks in the background of all battlefield victories.
Unlike some other Keegan volumes,
this work builds its effectiveness only
cumulatively through its stories. If one
picks up this book and reads but one or
two of the vignettes, a clear and timeless axiom of intelligence is likely to
elude him. It is through the cumulative
effect of all these stories, one after the
other, that we begin to grasp Keegan’s
broader point and see just how varied
in form and content, but fundamentally
useful, sound intelligence of every sort
can be. One clear contribution that this
book makes is to remind us that intelligence has much to do with mundane
issues of how dense that forest on the
map really is, how muddy that road
becomes in April, or how to interpret
what we inadvertently overhear on the
radio.
Professional military readers will understand intuitively the importance of
intelligence in the new kind of war the
United States finds itself fighting today,
and that brings us to the book’s subtitle. Given the recent debates over the
quality of American intelligence, many
readers will eagerly anticipate that
Keegan’s analysis of the war against
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al-Qa‘ida and that the war on terror will
be as fully developed as his examination of
Jackson’s Valley campaign or the battle
of Midway. Those readers will be disappointed. The discussion of al-Qa‘ida is
only a small part of his penultimate
chapter, “Military Intelligence since
1945,” which discusses the Falklands
War in greater length than what the
United States faces today. Nevertheless,
Keegan speculates that old-fashioned
human intelligence will be the best
means of carrying the war to the new
enemies of the United States, and
through his historical exposition of intelligence, we are well reminded just
how crucial this apparently mundane
work really is.
DAVID A. SMITH

Baylor University

Reeve, John, and David Stevens, eds. The Face of
Naval Battle: The Human Experience of Modern
War at Sea. Crows Nest, Australia: Allen and
Unwin, 2003. 363pp. $24.95

An author who uses the words “the face
of battle” in the title of any book pertaining to military matters is throwing
down a pretty hefty literary gauntlet.
For “face of battle” guarantees that the
work in question will be compared to
Keegan’s 1976 landmark volume of the
same name. Keegan asked the basic
question, “What is it like to be in a battle?” He sought the answer in a comparative study of the battles of Agincourt,
Waterloo, and the Somme.
John Reeve and David Stevens were well
aware their book would be compared to
The Face of Battle. In fact, they encourage the comparison and offer their
book as a sort of maritime bookend to
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Keegan’s earlier work. There is a patent
need for such a work and while some,
including Keegan himself, have tried to
fill it, none have yet succeeded. Despite a
most encouraging beginning, however,
Reeve and Stevens also miss the mark,
although this book is still worth reading.
Rather than a coherent examination of
the human experience of naval combat,
this work is a collection of essays by
seventeen separate authors, the majority of whom happen to be Australian.
This is not surprising when the reader
learns that most of the essays were originally presented at the 2001 King-Hall
Naval History Conference in Canberra.
The book starts off strongly with a masterful essay by John Reeve, who discusses naval history in general,
identifying certain challenges in “piercing the veil” of individuals’ experiences
in naval battle and suggesting an organizational approach, analogous to that
used by Keegan, that could be used to
grow a general understanding of naval
combat. Unfortunately, the use of
preexisting essays may have precluded
such an approach, and the promise of
the first chapter is not met in the book’s
subsequent pages.
The essays are arranged more or less in
chronological order and cover such diverse topics as a look at the battle of the
Yellow Sea, the treatment of German
sailors taken prisoner in World War I,
and the personal experiences of an officer in command of an Australian
guided missile destroyer in Operation
DESERT STORM.
Despite its failure to live up to the
promise of its title, this work is worth
reading for several reasons. First, much
of it, especially the portion written by
Russell Parkin, deals with the
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development of Australian naval power
and doctrine. Though it was one of the
staunchest allies of United States, Australia’s development and contributions
in this area are often overlooked or
misunderstood. In addition, the naval
challenges Australia has faced and continues to face are by and large shared by
other maritime nations that do not
have the industrial or economic capacity of a superpower. Thus the Australian experience may contain lessons for
other mid-sized naval powers. Furthermore, as all U.S. sailors lucky enough to
have worked with their counterparts
“down under” know, Australian warships are superbly handled, well maintained, and boldly employed. Australian
sailors’ maritime skills and contributions to both world wars, Korea, Vietnam, and DESERT STORM deserve wider
recognition.
A second reason to read this book is
that several of the writings illuminate
obscure yet fascinating historical episodes. Bruce Elleman’s discussion of the
1894 battle in the Yellow Sea between
modern Japanese and Chinese warships
is excellent, although his attempt to
draw parallels between the Chinese navy
of 1894 and that of today is on less firm
ground. Likewise, Michael Dowsett’s examination of the treatment of casualties
resulting from the 9 November 1914
battle between the German SMS Emden
and the Australian cruiser HMAS Sydney
makes for compelling reading.
A significant portion of this work is devoted to personal recollections. The
best of these are written by Rear Admiral Guy Griffiths, AO, DSO, DSC, RAN,
Ret., and Commodore Lee Cordner,
AM, RANR. Griffiths is a veteran of
World War II, Korea, and Vietnam,
where he commanded HMAS Hobart.
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Commodore Cordner commanded
HMAS Sydney during Operation
DESERT STORM and is an alumnus of
the Naval War College. A third essay,
written by Michael Whitby, which discusses the wartime diaries of Commander A. F. C. Layard, DSO, DSC,
RN, is also well done. Yet as good as
these individual accounts of service and
command are, so much more could
have been done if the editors had
mined these narratives for points of
commonality. For if the face of naval
battle is not so unique as to preclude
any similarities between one battle
and the next, it should be possible, as
Keegan did with land combat, to identify the shared perspectives and experiences that affect sailors who make war
upon the sea.
At least the editors did not fall into the
trap of concentrating solely upon the
memoirs of officers. Some room is also
provided to the enlisted view of naval
combat. These include a discussion by
David Jones on the wartime experiences of U.S. submariner Thomas R.
Parks, and Peter Stanley’s quick look
at the naval life of J. S. Macdonnell,
who rose to the rank of gunner in the
Royal Australian Navy and then went
on to a life of writing “potboiler” novels. While entertaining, and at times
poignant, these recollections, like
those of the senior officers, lack the
analysis and study that could elevate
them to more than just brief biographical sketches.
The book concludes, somewhat predictably, with a look at “The Face of the Future Naval Battle.” There is a discussion
of such emerging technologies and concepts as network-centric warfare, and
transformation and concept-led longrange planning. These complex issues
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are barely touched upon, so readers who
are familiar with them will not learn
anything new, and readers who had not
heard of them will know little more.
No doubt the day will come when
someone will write the book that truly
reveals the face of naval battle in all its
dimensions, but this is not the day.
Taken as a whole, Reeves and Stevens
have created a work of interest and
merit that is able to stand on its own. It
is a significant contribution to an increased understanding of history and
the contribution of the Royal Australian Navy. Readers who do not expect
more will not be disappointed.
RICHARD J. NORTON

Naval War College

Phillips, Donald T., and James M. Loy. Character
in Action: The U.S. Coast Guard on Leadership.
Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
178pp. $22.50

According to the opening chapter, the
Coast Guard manages to achieve a complex mission on an annual budget that
is smaller than 2 percent of all the other
services’ combined budgets. Phillips
and Loy identify a twelve-part mission
that includes responsibilities ranging
from boating safety to homeland defense. Thus they argue that the Coast
Guard provides a valuable case study
for leading a complex organization because it achieves so much with limited
funds.
Using a variety of approaches, including historical examples, anecdotes, and
organizational philosophy, Phillips and
Loy illustrate sixteen principles that
they believe are foundations for a well
run organization. For example, the first
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principle they posit is “define the culture and live the values.” By discussing
exactly how the Coast Guard achieves
this goal, they then set forth how this
principle can also be successfully implemented by other organizations.
The authors are uniquely positioned
to examine Coast Guard leadership.
Donald Phillips has written ten books
on leadership, including the best-selling
Lincoln on Leadership (Simon and
Schuster, 1992), and spent twenty-five
years as a manager in major corporations. After graduating from the Coast
Guard Academy in 1964, coauthor Admiral James Loy served in the Coast
Guard for over thirty years, culminating
in four years as commandant. Upon his
retirement in 2003, he assumed the post
of administrator of the Transportation
Security Administration.
Overall, this book has many points to
recommend it. Unlike many management books, this one is written in an
easy-to-read fashion. The aforementioned sixteen principles are grouped
into four parts: Set the Foundation, Focus on People, Instill a Bias for Action,
and Ensure the Future. Readers can
thus focus on groups of principles that
are of specific importance or interest in
their own organization. In addition,
while leaders may be reluctant to read a
management book that discusses “sea
stories” over the latest theories, the authors do an excellent job of linking the
Coast Guard experience to leadership
and management principles. Every
chapter closes with a summary of the
important leadership points behind
each principle.
The leadership principles presented
here will resonate with federal civilian
and military managers alike as many relate to issues they currently face. The
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chapters that cover “Promoting Team
over Self” and “Instilling a Commitment for Action” in part 1 will assist
those federal leaders who work in a
team environment. In part 2, “Focus on
People,” there are discussions of such
principles as “Eliminating the Frozen
Middle,” “Cultivating Caring Relationships,” and “Creating an Effective
Communication System.” The Coast
Guard experience in this area may be a
source of ideas to federal leaders who
are currently struggling with workforce
planning issues such as recruitment, retention, and motivating a large population that is or soon will be retirement
eligible. Part 3, “Instill a Bias for Action,” also proves helpful in thinking
about current issues. For instance,
chapter 12’s “Give the Field Priority”
will provide ideas to both military leaders working to implement networkcentric warfare and a State Department
leader working to improve communication between Washington and the field.
Other chapters in this section, “Make
Change the Norm” or “Encouraging
Decisiveness,” may seem self-evident,
but they are actually cultural changes
needed to bring the federal workforce
into the twenty-first century. Lastly,
part 4’s discussion of “Ensure the Future” may also seem obvious, but a recent management survey noted that
most workers want to hear “thank you”
above all other rewards. Chapters on
topics of “Spotlighting Excellence” are
also important reads.
Character in Action does have some limitations. Due to a publication date that
preceded the Coast Guard’s merger into
the Department of Homeland Security,
readers may find themselves wondering
if the book’s lessons still hold true. For
an answer to this question, see the
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Spring 2004 Review article “Change and
Continuity: The U.S. Coast Guard Today,” by Admiral Thomas H. Collins.
LAURA MILLER

Naval War College

Funabashi, Yoichi, ed. Reconciliation in the AsiaPacific. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace,
2003. 240pp. $19.95

Asia’s brutal colonial and wartime history has left wounds that continue to
shape the region’s politics and international relations. Traditional approaches
to international relations say little
about how to overcome lingering animosity and to replace it with trust and
harmonious relations. Time alone is
never a solution. Nor, as Japan has discovered repeatedly, are apologies
enough. Even need, as that between developing China and economically and
technologically advanced Japan, is insufficient. The contributors to this volume demonstrate that the path to
reconciliation is different for each
country, requiring unique blends of a
wide range of political and social ingredients, many of which are in short
supply.
This volume is the result of a conference sponsored by the U.S. Institute of
Peace, which includes chapters on intrastate (Taiwan, Cambodia, East Timor,
Australia) as well as interstate relations
(Japan-China, Japan-Korea, North
Korea–South Korea, and an appendix
on Germany-Poland). Its timing is propitious as reconciliation itself is a growing phenomenon. South Africa’s Truth
and Reconciliation Commission and
the UN-led war crimes tribunals for
Bosnia and Rwanda have elevated world
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consciousness. Democratization has allowed for the spread of appropriate legal structures, even as it has promoted
self-awareness and sometimes ethnic
nationalism. Media attention and the
Internet strengthen such dynamics.
Yet the kind of success seen in South
Africa and between Germany and its
European neighbors has not been
achieved in the Asia-Pacific. Daqing
Yang shows how, following normalization of relations and apologies by Tokyo, the “history problem” resurfaced
in the 1980s and has not gone away
since. Diet members and millions of
Japanese citizens have expressed their
opposition to offer further apologies
and to any prolonged self-flagellation.
For its part, Beijing occasionally “plays
the history card” in order to wrest concessions out of Japan, although the
“card” is often played because of belligerent actions in Tokyo and “held” by
the millions of Chinese who retain legitimate grievances for the ills of the
1930s and 1940s. Yang argues that historians on both sides need to acknowledge the complexity of the relationship
and to disseminate their knowledge
among large segments of the population. A more fundamental problem is
that reconciliation presupposes an autonomous society capable of critical
self-examination—in other words, democracy. In this case the People’s Republic of China has a long way to go.
Victor Cha explains how despite the establishment of formal relations between
Seoul and Tokyo in 1965, and a great
deal of mutual interest and admiration
between the two societies, historical animosities prevent the sort of cooperation that one might expect from a
rational or realpolitik perspective. The
two main South Korean national
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holidays celebrate independence from
Japanese colonial rule. Substantive
problems include the content of Japanese history textbooks, the political and
social discrimination to which some
650,000 Korean-Japanese are subjected,
the memory of Korean forced laborers
killed by the atomic bombs, and the use
of Korean “comfort women” by Japanese troops during the war. The security threat of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as
concern in Seoul and Tokyo over
Washington’s commitment to provide a
security umbrella, have both contributed to the steps toward reconciliation
that have been made, including apologies, high-level meetings on the subject,
and the establishment of consultations
on security cooperation. Cha argues
that democracy and development have
contributed to this process. “As generations of Koreans, in the South or in a
unified entity, come to live in a democratic and developed society, they will
cultivate norms of compromise, nonviolence, and respect for opposing viewpoints that will become externalized in
their attitudes toward Japan.”
The argument about democracy and
norms is critical. Interestingly, Seoul’s
perception of a lessened threat from the
DPRK has actually increased its invectives toward Japan. Cha claims that
without a process of identity change,
material incentives such as the need for
security or economic cooperation alone
cannot ensure a continued march toward reconciliation.
This notion also captures the promise
and peril of intra-Korean relations,
where the nature and timing of reconciliation will have serious implications
for the region’s security. Scott Snyder
argues that Pyongyang’s economic
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needs have driven the process, while
public opinion in the South has determined its course. South Korean
nongovernment organizations have
also contributed large sums of money.
The whole process presents a major
challenge to the North’s system “as it
will be more and more difficult to build
fences around South Korean economic
investments and business practices.”
Once again, democratization and normative development will be as important
as economic and security imperatives to
successful reconciliation. Considering
the implications, it is sobering to consider that there is no obvious way that
such identity change can occur peacefully in North Korea.
Internal reconciliation processes are no
easier than external ones. Nayan
Chanda explains how Cambodia has
achieved only superficial reconciliation
following the genocidal acts of the
Khmer Rouge regime. The Buddhist
tradition can justify much as resulting
from actions of a prior life. The lack of
political stability makes many Cambodians fearful of reopening old wounds,
particularly when racist aspects of Cambodia’s political philosophy may bear
some culpability. Phnom Penh earlier
granted amnesties that would make it
difficult to prosecute former leaders,
and more recently argued that a fullblown tribunal would make reconciliation less likely. The legitimacy bestowed
on the regime by other states makes
prosecution somewhat awkward, and
China opposes revealing fully the record of the former regime. The prospects are not good for major trials
capable of healing this nation.
Other chapters present a mixed record
on the prospects and benefits of reconciliation for Aborigines in Australia and
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East Timor, and for the loved ones who
died in a popular uprising on Taiwan in
1947. In addition to the political and
cultural repression involved, the dead
in each case number in the tens of
thousands. The Taiwan case makes
what is probably the most convincing
argument that democratization and political stability, combined with firm political leadership, are critical to
successful reconciliation.
All who study Asian security or the role
of justice in international relations
should read this book. Reconciliation
can bring restorative justice to war-torn
peoples. However, this requires a rejection of purely retributive justice. In addition, the case studies in this volume
reinforce that there is no universal formula and that a great deal of political
creativity and political courage is required. As the editor also concludes,
victims and victimizers must work together and maintain a forward-looking
approach, preferably in a democratic
environment. Most of all, there must be
a commitment to the process. It is perhaps this factor that promotes the kind
of identity change that is required for
true reconciliation.
JOHN GAROFANO

Naval War College

Langston, Thomas S. Uneasy Balance: Civil-Military
Relations in Peacetime America since 1783. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2003. $39.95

Thomas S. Langston believes “it has
never been easy for Americans to decide
what to do with the military” at the end
of a war. During peacetime, should the
military solely focus on preparing for
future wars, or should it usefully serve
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the nation in other ways? Langston cites
some examples of the military providing a service to the nation during peacetime. For instance, after the War of
1812, the military “took the lead in
opening the West for settlement” by
building roads, surveying canals, and
farming. After World War I, the military “operated the main barge line on
the Mississippi River . . . operated and
extended cable and telegraph lines in
Alaska, operated steamship and canal
services in Panama, and responded to
natural disasters.”
According to Langston, the “transition
to peace and the postwar era” is important to civil-military relations.
Langston, a professor of political science at Tulane, has written several
books with political themes, including:
With Reverence and Contempt: How
Americans Think about Their President
(1995), and Ideologues and Presidents:
From the New Deal to the Reagan Revolution (1992).
Langston relies on historical analysis
and judgment to determine how the
military balanced war preparation and
internal reform with service to the nation after the following conflicts: the
Revolutionary War, the War of 1812,
the Mexican War, the Civil War, the
Spanish-American War, World War I,
World War II, the Vietnam War, and
the Cold War. He wrote this book
halfway through George W. Bush’s
term and before Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Langston predicted that the war
on terror would essentially be like a police operation, similar to the war on
drugs. It turns out, however, that the
post–Cold War peace was short-lived;
America currently finds itself fully engaged in the war on terror.
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Independent of whether the United
States is currently fighting a war or enjoying peace, Langston’s thesis still applies, believing that the ideal postwar
transition balances military reform with
service to the nation. This balanced
“happy state of affairs” occurs when
there is cooperation between civilian
and military leaders and when “political
consensus [is] in support of the military
and its varied uses.” For example, is
there agreement for the use of military
force? Should it be used to protect only
vital interests or should it also support
humanitarian objectives? Does the nation expect a “peace dividend”? According to the author, during the post–Cold
War period of the late 1990s, there was
an uneasy balance between the military’s desire to hold onto a Cold War
force structure and the president’s use
of military force that “stretched a
shrinking force around the globe.”
In my opinion, it is understandable that
the military would want to prepare for
the next war during peacetime. Likewise, it makes sense for the nation to
expect the military to provide different
services to the nation when not at war.
My only wish is that the author had
specifically recommended a list of military service projects for the post–Cold
War period.
Langston’s work is useful because of its
depth of research on previous peacetime periods. Although all the details
can be cumbersome, his idea that military and civilian leaders must cooperate
and reach consensus on the purpose of
a peacetime military force is clear and
succinct.
CYNTHIA PERROTTI

Naval War College
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Dick, Steven J. Sky and Ocean Joined: The U.S.
Naval Observatory, 1830–2000. Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003. 609pp. $130

In this beautifully produced, albeit very
expensive volume, Steven Dick of the
U.S. Naval Observatory in Washington,
D.C., has written the fascinating story
of the origins and development of the
Navy’s and the nation’s oldest scientific
organization. It is a fascinating and well
written story that ranges from the establishment of the observatory in 1830,
as part of the Navy’s Depot of Charts
and Instruments under Lieutenant
Louis Goldsborough, to the sixteenand-a-half-year tenure of the longestserving superintendent, Matthew
Fontaine Maury, who led when it was
first designated the National Observatory. The institution was originally established to serve the very practical
application of astronomy to the measurement of time in day-to-day navigation at sea. Under Charles Wilkes and
Maury, it quickly moved beyond this
restricted use to extend its work to geomagnetic, astronomical, and meteorological observations that soon brought
it into the forefront of scientific research, bringing global credit to the
U.S. Navy and the United States.
Dick, who has a degree in astrophysics,
as well as a doctorate in the history and
philosophy of science, tells the wideranging story of the observatory’s work
over 170 years, from the rise in the use
of the chronometer in the U.S. Navy in
the early nineteenth century, to its new
work in the opening of the twenty-first
century with the application of the satellite Global Positioning System. His
highly competent and very readable explanation of the observatory’s scientific
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accomplishments ranges across the
administrative and bureaucratic elements in its history and provides strikingly humanistic portraits of some of
the key and colorful scientific figures
that were involved, such as Maury,
Simon Newcomb, and Asaph Hall.
The story that unfolds encompasses a
range of fascinating and quite different
events and details, which many readers,
whether they are general readers, naval
historians, or historians of science, will
not readily associate with the achievements of the U.S. Navy. Chief among
them are the discovery of Phobos and
Deimos, the moons of the planet Mars,
and Charon, the moon of Pluto; the sixteen nineteenth-century expeditions to
measure the transit of Venus across the
face of the Sun; and the establishment
of the master clock of the United States.
In terms of practical contributions to
fleet operations, the observatory played
a key role in providing the most
up-to-date navigational technology to
ships at sea, even mass-producing chronometers during both world wars, and
providing early applications of
punch-card calculating technology for
the production of an improved and
more accurate American Air Almanac
from 1941. Because the Nautical Almanac had one of the few scientific computation laboratories in the United
States, its equipment was adapted in
late 1943 to do rapid calculations in
spherical trigonometry to calculate the
positions of German U-boats, using incoming intelligence and radio bearings
from a hundred listening stations
around the world. For this purpose, the
observatory staff used the equipment at
night, when it was not being used for
Almanac computations, and calculated
solutions to a quarter of a million
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spherical triangles to locate the realtime positions of enemy U-boats within
five miles.
For those interested in the history of
Washington, D.C., the book contains a
fascinating account of the different sites
of the Naval Observatory, as it moved
from its first location on G Street near
the White House, to Capitol Hill from
1834 to 1842, to temporary quarters on
Pennsylvania Avenue near New Hampshire Avenue from 1842 to 1844, on to
Foggy Bottom until 1893. It was then
that famed architect Richard Morris
Hunt designed the buildings on Observatory Hill on Massachusetts Avenue,
including the Superintendent’s Residence, which served from 1928 as the
residence of the Chief of Naval Operations, and which in 1974 was designated
as the official residence of the vice president of the United States.
Readers of this journal will be particularly interested in the recurring
civilian-military controversy through
the observatory’s history and in the question as to whether the Navy should hand
over administration of all or part of its
functions to the Smithsonian Institution, the National Bureau of Standards,
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or some other civilian agency. The natural administrative tensions that result
from competing national security interests and scientific interests were
ameliorated as early as 1908 by the creation of the Astronomical Council that
allowed leading astronomers to have an
influence on decisions relating to the
staff’s scientific work. From 1958, with
the employment of increasingly complicated astronomical technology, the appointment of a civilian scientific
director has provided a more effective
means to work under the active-duty
naval officer who is the superintendent.
On this point, Dick concludes that
maintaining the observatory as a scientific institution under Department of
Defense control, within the Department
of the Navy, is particularly important in
regard to the observatory’s continuing
role in providing accurate atomic-clock
time to the Global Positioning System
satellites and its contributions to accurate detail on star positions and earth
orientation, critical elements to current
defense projects in space.
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